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Hannah Arendt, one of the most outstanding political theorists of the 20th century, 
believed that our decisions about right and wrong depend on our choice of 
company and especially on who we choose as exemplary figures for our moral 
and political orientation.1 Arendt herself called upon a number of such exemplary 
figures: Socrates, Cicero, Christ, Augustine, Montesquieu, the Founding Fathers, 
Kant, and Heidegger, to mention a few. On what grounds, however, do we choose 
our company and the figures we are supposed to follow? For Arendt, this question 
relates to judgment and taste, both outcomes of the faculty of judgment, which 
according to her is probably the most political of man’s mental abilities.2 In other 
words, it is the judgments of this political faculty that determine our choice of friends 
and examples – and consequently, our decisions about right and wrong, since 
these decisions depend on our choice of company.
Yet Arendt had at least two different conceptions of judgment. In both of them, 
the human capacity to judge is intimately linked to one’s capacity to think, but the 
image of thinking they invoke is different. In the first model thinking is conceived 
as a dialogue with oneself, whereas judgment is conceived as the manifestation 
of this dialogue.3 This dialogue is a solitary business, deriving its criteria not from 
the world but from the individual conscience, which Arendt conceives as the 
inevitable by-product of thinking. Hence, although judgments direct attention to the 
world, being the manifestation of thought, they are nevertheless mediated by the 
conscience, which in itself is a “worldless” and inherently inward-turning. It merely 
guards that one does not contradict oneself in one’s thinking, that is to say, it tells 
what is suitable for me as a thinking being. In this respect, Arendt’s model was 
1  Hannah Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy.” In Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and 
Judgement. New York: Schocken Books, 2003, 145–146.
2  Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. New York: Harvest Book, 1971, Vol. I, 192.
3  Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations.” In Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and 
Judgment. New York: Schocken Books, 2003, 189.
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Socrates, but although she embraced certain Socratic ideas, her negative attitude 
to the self as the centre of existence makes it understandable that she never fully 
accepted the triad of thinking-conscience-judgment as the solution to the problem 
of how to choose one’s company or to tell right from wrong, arguing that it has any 
relevance only under exceptional circumstances in which all moral standards have 
been rendered inoperative.
Arendt’s second conception of judgment calls on Immanuel Kant as its example. 
Here the emphasis is no longer on the self but rather on others. The idea of thinking 
as the precondition for judgment takes on a different form as well. The solitary 
dialogue is replaced by a capacity to think representatively, that is, to think from the 
viewpoint of everybody else. Arendt called this capacity an “enlarged mentality,” 
adopting the term from Kant’s Critique of Judgment. According to Arendt, it is this 
enlarged mentality that should determine our decisions about right and wrong. In a 
sense, this means that we should choose everybody as our company:
The more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given 
issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, 
the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final 
conclusions, my opinion.4 
This does not mean that “my opinion” should be the same as that of the majority. 
Although Arendt was always critical of the Platonic idea that a (transcendent) truth 
could provide the measure of politics, she did not find the opinion of the (immanent) 
multitude a satisfactory standard either. On the contrary, her critique of the modern 
mass society suggests that the enlarged mentality does not primarily concern a 
people’s standpoint but rather people’s standpoints. If Arendt affirms the multitude, 
she does not affirm it as a Voice but rather as a plurality of voices. In a sense, it 
is this plurality as such that should be chosen as the exemplary figure. It should 
be chosen as the model even under conditions in which factual plurality has been 
reduced to the minimum, as happened in the National Socialist Germany. In these 
kinds of situations plurality must be recreated – and it is created by the human 
capacity of imagination.
The approach of the present volume on Hannah Arendt’s thought can best be 
illustrated in terms of her own notions of the exemplary figure and the enlarged 
mentality associated with the human capacity of imagination. To all of us who have 
contributed articles to this volume, Arendt has indeed been an exemplary figure in 
the light of whom we have sought to orient ourselves, without undue obedience or 
imitation. Some of the articles are, in fact, quite critical in tone. The reason why we 
have all chosen Arendt as our guidepost is simple: she suits our intellectual taste. 
But she suits the taste of each contributor for a different reason, whence comes the 
4  Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books, 1977, 241.
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plurality of the standpoints presented in the volume. This is not to say that the articles 
would have no common denominators. The main contribution of this volume to the 
growing body of research on one of the most interesting political theorists of the 20th 
century concerns the contexts of Arendt’s thought. This is how we understand the 
enlarged mentality and imagination: as going beyond the immanence of Arendt’s 
own texts and locating points of comparison and reference, either in works of other 
philosophers or in the context of history and history of ideas.
In her article “What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about ‘how to live in 
the world’: Caritas, Natality, and the Banality of Evil,” Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott 
insightfully analyzes the avant-garde intellectual context of Arendt’s post world war 
career in the United States and particularly in New York, as well as the Augustinian 
background of Arendt’s political and ethical thought. Vecchiarelli focuses especially 
on the Arendtian notions of caritas, natality, and the banality of evil, laying emphasis 
on the fact that all of these terms are already present in Arendt’s 1929 dissertation 
on Augustine’s philosophy. 
Jussi Backman’s article “The End of Action: An Arendtian Critique of Aristotle’s 
Concept of Praxis” re-examines the Aristotelian backdrop of Arendt’s notion of 
action. On the one hand, Backman takes up Arendt’s critique of the hierarchy 
of human activities in Aristotle, according to which Aristotle subordinates action 
(praxis) to production (poiêsis) and contemplation (theoria). Backman argues that 
this is not the case since Aristotle conceives theoria as the most perfect form of 
praxis. On the other hand, Backman stresses that Arendt’s notion of action is in fact 
very different from Aristotle’s praxis, to the extent that Arendt thinks of action as an 
external to the means-ends scheme, whereas Aristotle ultimately remains caught 
in this scheme proper to production (poiêsis) in thinking of praxis as its own end. 
According to Backman, Arendt’s concept of action can therefore be understood as 
a critique, rather than as a rehabilitation of Aristotelian praxis.
In his article “Hannah Arendt’s Thesis of Different Modes of Evil,” Jari Kauppinen 
examines Arendt’s different and sometimes quite contradictory concepts of evil 
(“absolute evil,” “radical evil,” “banal evil”). He compares these concepts with the 
traditional Western conceptions of evil, considering among others the notions of 
Augustine, Kant, and Heidegger. In Kauppinen’s view, Arendt’s notion of evil is 
basically Augustinian (evil exists in the world as the privation of good), but he pays 
attention to other, less apparent aspects in the Arendtian conception as well. In 
addition, Kauppinen’s article offers us an overview of the recent interpretations of 
Arendt’s understanding of evil.
Mika Ojakangas’s article “Arendt, Socrates, and the Ethics of Conscience” 
examines Arendt’s idea of thoughtlessness as the source of evil and her suggestion 
that the activity of thinking could resist evil, by focusing on Arendt’s interpretation 
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of Socrates as a conscientiously thinking being and thus, the opposite of Adolph 
Eichmann. Ojakangas argues that Arendt’s interpretation of Socratic ethics is 
somewhat misguided and open to correction: it is not thinking as such but rather 
bad conscience that is the alpha and omega of Socratic ethics. By this very gesture 
Socrates profoundly changed the moral landscape of the Greek polis, paving the 
way for the Western ethics of guilt.
Julia Honkasalo’s article “What Constitutes Our Sense of Reality? Hannah 
Arendt’s Critique of the Search for Epistemic Foundations” examines Arendt’s 
epistemological assumptions and specifically, her critique of epistemological 
foundationalism. Honkasalo argues that Arendt’s critique of epistemological 
foundationalism pertains to its rationalist and empiricist version, both culminating in 
the mathematization of nature. In her view, Arendt’s own epistemological position is 
based on a conception according to which it is language that must function as the 
starting point of inquiry. Language is not, for Arendt, a fixed system but defined by 
historically contingent linguistic conventions, meaning, as Honkasalo stresses, that 
Arendtian epistemology leads to a position in which our scientific truths as well as 
moral doctrines are seen to be contingent, open to critical debate, and fallibilistic. 
Finally, in his imaginative article “Hannah Arendt’s Angels and Demons: Ten 
Spiritual Exercises,” Markku Koivusalo journeys to the metaphysical and mystical 
roots of Arendtian thought, emphasizing its embeddedness not only in the Western 
tradition of philosophy but also in Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Christian mythology 
and theology. Koivusalo’s article focuses on notions such as birth, beginning, 
genius, and fame in Arendt’s work, using the images of angels and demons as 
the metaphorical guides to his investigation. The article thus offers us a fresh 
“angelological” reading of Arendt’s political and ethical thought.
The articles in the volume are based on papers presented at the Practice, 
Thought, and Judgement – Hannah Arendt 100 Years Anniversary Symposium, 
held at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in November 2006. I want to 
thank all those who participated in the symposium and especially Joanna Vechiarelli 
Scott and Dana R. Villa, our keynote speakers. Furthermore, I want to thank all 
the organizers, particularly Marja-Liisa Honkasalo, Krista Johansson, and Julia 
Honkasalo, for their indispensable contribution to matters practical and somewhat 
less practical before, during, and after the symposium. In addition, I want to thank 
Krista Johansson and Tuomas Tammilehto for editorial assistance. Finally, I want 
to thank Soili Petäjäniemi-Brown for correcting the language of the articles.
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